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COMMENTS
Access of Indigents into the Civil Courtroom:
The Continuing Saga of Poor Richard
We can trace the gradual evolution of this principle [equality before
the law] under the common law into its broad and firmly established
modern form. We should expect to find that provisions for speeding
the litigation of the needy had correspondingly ripened from mere in-
dulgences into categorical imperatives of common law practice. But
that has not occurred.'
John MacArthur Maguire wrote those condemnatory words in 1923.
He would be abashed to find that the same description applies to the
problems of the indigent who seeks entrance into today's .civil courtroom,2
In attempts to solve these problems, the courts, states, and federal govern-
ment have taken differing routes' with widely varying results for the in-
digent.' In some instances, as Maguire noted, there has actually been a
retrogression from the common law.5 In some cases there has been
progress.6 In all cases the outcome has been affected by the three interests
involved-the legislature, the courts, and the constitution. To date the
state legislatures have been the most frequent commentators on the prob-
lem.7 Until recently the courts have filled the chinks in only minor re-
spects.' The focus of this comment will be on these three interests. While
IMaguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HIv. L. REV. 361, 362 (1923)
[hereinafter cited as Maguire].
2 See generally AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, 2 DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIM-
INAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE COUmTS (1965); AMERiCAN BAR FOUNDATION,
PUBLIC PROVISION FOR COSTS AND EXPENSES OF CIVIL LITIGATION (1966); Silver-
stein, Waiver of Court Costs and Appointment of Counsel for Poor Persons in
Civil Cases, 2 VALPARAISO U.L. REv. 21 (1967); Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal
Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949) ; Note, Procedure: Suits In
Forna Pauperis, 6, CALIF. L. REV. 226 (1918); Note, Litigation Costs: The Hid-
den Barrier to the Indigent, 56 GEO. L.J. 516 (1968).
'Courts: See, e.g., McClenahan v. Thomas, 6 N.C. 247 (1813), States: See,
e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-432 & 60-2001 (a), (b) (1964). Federal Government:
See, e.g., proceedings in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1964).
'Compare ARK. STAT. ANN. §§27-401 to -06 (1947) with UNIFORM RE-
CIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT (1958 version) [hereinafter cited as
URESA].
VWhedbee v. Ruffin, 191 N.C. 257, 131 S.E. 653 (1926) ; See generally Annot.,
6 A.L.R. 1281 (1920).
See, e.g., the provisions of the URESA.
See p. 688 & note 43 infra.
8 Only six states have held that an indigent may sue in forma pauperils without
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each area will be treated separately, the thesis common to all three is that
in each an attempt has been made to crack the doors of the civil court-
room to the indigent. Likewise, in each area there is a significant pro-
viso to the thesis-that all of the solutions offered present inherent prob-
lems to the indigent, which either have, or may, block effective entrance
to the courts.
STATE COURT DECISIONS-WASHINGTON
Basis of Decision
In O'Connor v. Matzdorff9 the Washington Supreme Court decided
that a justice of the peace might accept an action filed without payment of
filing fees, in the face of Washington statutes that required the justice
to collect the fees.10
The plaintiff filed an action for replevin and damages against her land-
lord in the Yakima Justice Court and offered in lieu of filing fees a "mo-
tion and affidavit for leave to proceed in forma pauperis."' u The justice
of the peace and his clerk refused to accept the complaint on the basis that
the three-and-one-half-dollar filing fee required by statute had not been
paid.1 2 The justice of the peace also denied leave to proceed in forma
pauperis."3 Plaintiff then petitioned the Washington Supreme Court for
a writ of mandamus compelling the justice of the peace to grant the pe-
legislative authority. Martin v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. 289, 168 P. 135 (1917) ;
McClenahan v. Thomas, 6 N.C. 247 (1813); Jack v. McClure, 26 Pa. County Ct.
59 (1901); Spalding v. Bainbridge, 12 RI. 244 (1879); Hickey v. Rhine, 16 Tex.
576 (1856); O'Connor v. Matzdorff, 76 Wash. 2d 589, 458 P.2d 154 (1969).
Recently the Supreme Court has decided that a state may not close its divorce
courts to indigents. Boddie v. Connecticut, 91 S. Ct. 780 (1971).
9 76 Wash. 2d 589, 458 P.2d 154 (1969).
21 WASH. REV. CODE § 3.16.080 (1961) provides:
[T]he plaintiff may, at the time of such commencement or transfer, pay to
such justice the sum of two dollars ....
WASH. REV. CODE § 3.16.110 (1961) provides:
The justices of the peace ... shall charge and collect... all the fees now or
hereafter allowed by law paid or chargeable in all cases ....
WAsH. REV. CODE § 3.16.140 (1961) provides:
Said justices... shall not in any case, except for the state or county and
other cases provided by law, perform any official services unless the fees
prescribed for such services are paid in advance ....
WASH. REv. CoDE, § 27.24.070 (1970) provides:
There shall be paid.., to each justice of the peace in every civil action...
where the demand or value of the property in controversy is one hundred
dollars or more, in addition to other fees required by law the sum of one dol-
lar and fifty cents ....11 76 Wash. 2d at 590, 458 P.2d at 155.
12 Id.
18 Id. at 591, 458 P.2d at 155.
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tition and accept the complaint. The court issued the writ and held that
given an impoverished suitor and a nonfrivolous claim, it had the inherent
power to waive fees even in the face of a contrary statute.14
The court declared that in interpreting a statute it must presume (1)
that the legislature did not intend to remove by statute a power inherently
held by a court at common law15 and (2) that the legislature did not in-
tend to take away from a court the duty and the right to do substantial
justice to the parties before it.'"
Although some courts have held otherwise,17 apparently the English
common law courts had the power to waive fees or costs of an indigent
plaintiff.' 8 After establishing this common law power, the Washington
court turned to a series of California decisions beginning with Martin
v. Superior Court9 for applications of principles of waiver of costs and
fees to civil cases in the United States."0 The court in Martin held that
the judiciary might disregard statutory direction for collection of fees on
the basis of the English common law.'
In re Bruen,22 a 1918 Washington case, was used in O'Connor to
support the second argument that the court must do substantial justice
between the litigants. The court in Bruen said that "[t]he inherent
power of the court is the power to protect itself . . . [and] the power
to administer justice whether any previous form of remedy had been
granted or not .... 
Problems with the Decision
Inherent in any solution offered to expedite entrance of the indigent
into the civil courtroom are several problems that must be solved if the
entrance is to be an effective one. These problems are not necessarily
1
,Id. at 600, 458 P.2d at 160.
1 Id. at 597, 458 P.2d at 158.
Id. at 602, 458 P.2d at 162.17See, e.g., Roy v. Louisville N.O. & T.R.R., 34 F. 276 (C.C.W.D. Tenn.
1888) ; Howe v. Federal Sur. Co., 161 Okla. 144, 17 P.2d 404 (1932) ; State ez rel.
Langhorne v. Superior Court, 32 Wash. 80, 72 P. 1027 (1903).8 See generally Maguire. See also Annot., 6 A.L.R. 1281 (1920).
10176 Cal. 289, 168 P. 135 (1917).
" The weight of authority seems to be against the California decisions. See,
e.g., Howe v. Federal Sur. Co., 161 Okla. 144, 17 P.2d 404 (1932).
.91176 Cal. at 294, 168 P. at 137. California bad adopted the English common law
by statute "so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution
of the United States, or the Constitution or laws of this state." CAL. Civ. CoDna§ 22.2 (West 1954). The Washington Supreme Court did not refer to any
similar authority, and Washington apparently has no similar statute.
102 Wash. 472, 172 P. 1152 (1918).28 Id. at 476, 172 P. at 1153.
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common only to the judicial scheme offered by the Washington court-
some can and will arise in the constitutional and statutory contexts.
The first of these problems facing the indigent is the attitude of the
judiciary toward him and to anything "given" to him. Especially notice-
able is the attitude of the justice of the peace court.24 Generally these courts
are "the weakest part of the judicial system: 'staffed by the poorest trained,
least experienced and least competent judges and... served by the lowest
ranking, least competent and least responsible attorneys.' "2 Interviews
of Office of Economic Opportunity program directors have revealed that
these same judges are generally nonsympathetic to the indigent and tend
toward "[c]lose questioning of litigants as to their eligibility for legal
services, refusal to approve in forma pauperis proceedings, and irritation
with the OEO attorney for pressing heretofore minute points of law."o2
Yet these hostilities are not necessarily restricted to the judges in the
smaller claims courts. A United States Court of Appeals judge in dis-
cussing the federal statute 7 remarked:
One might have expected that the courts would fill the gaps and
resolve the ambiguities in the act in a manner favorable to the poor
litigant, but they have not. On the contrary, from the beginning they
have approached the Act of 1892 with hostility and ... have shown a
penurious attitude toward the expenditure of public funds. 28
The hostility noted by these authors and its sometimes accompanying lack
of competence bear import for the indigent, for even should he be granted
an absolute right to freedom from court "expenses," active judicial hos-
tility could make the grant worthless.
Another area where judicial hostility may bring striking results is in
deciding the scope of the term "pauper." The Washington Supreme Court
defined the term by way of dictum, pointing out that
the term does not and cannot, in keeping with the concept of equal
justice to every man, mean absolute destitution or total insolvency.
24 This term is used to denote those courts handling the small claims of the poor.
In North Carolina the function is performed by either the magistrate or the dis-
trict judge.
"Stumpf, Law and Poverty: A Political Perspective, 1968 Wis. L. R.v. 694,
718, quoting address by J. Carlin, Annual Meeting of American Political Science
Association, Sept. 6-19, 1966.20 Id. at 719.
"'Proceedings in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1964).
" Duniway, The Poor Man in the Federal Courts, 18 STAN. L. Rav. 1270, 1277
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Duniway].
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Rather it connotes a state of impoverishment or lack of resources on the
part of the defendant which, when realistically reviewed in the light of
everyday practicalities, substantially and effectively impairs or prevents
his pursuit of his remedy.29
As the Washington court noted, 'the standard for qualification must be
reasonably flexible or there will be an almost insurmountable equal pro-
tection problem." Yet the flexible standard has its own pitfalls, one being
the large amount of discretion left in the hands of the trial judge."1 This
discretion in the past has led to disparate opinions as to who may pro-
ceed in forma pauperis. 32 This variance in result is tolerated by holdings
of higher courts that it takes a "manifest" abuse of discretion to overturn
a determination by the trier of facts that the indigent in question is not en-
titled to sue in forma pauperis.33 Should the appellate courts make it
clear that the standard is a liberal one, designed to favor the applicant, 4
and that absolute discretion is not vested in the trier of facts, then the ef-
fects of the hiostility could be counteracted, and eventually the number of
appeals on this issue reduced. 5 This liberality and limited discretion
seem to be incorporated in the Washington opinion, although some re-
iteration may be necessary before these points filter down to the lower
courts.
Closely related to the question of the acceptable level of indigency
is the issue of frivolity. The Washington Supreme Court indicated that a
preliminary discretionary judgment as to the merits of the action would
have to be made. 6 This approach contains all of the limitations noted
above. The dilemma is aptly posed by Maguire:
Take another administrative matter: the winnowing out of sound
claims from unsound ones. If this is not done at all, the courts will be
clogged. If the test is made too strict, the poor are likely to lose most
O'Connor v. Matzdorff, 76 Wash. 2d 589, 594, 458 P.2d 154, 156-57 (1969).
For an inflexible standard see, e.g., Aix. STAT. ANN. § 27-402 (1947).
1The Washington court implied that the justice of the peace has discretion
regarding this matter. 76 Wash. 2d at 606-07, 458 P.2d at 164.
8" See, e.g., Fuller v. State, 1 Cal. App. 3d 664, 82 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1969) (must
prove prima facie inability to furnish security, even if on welfare) ; Severa v.
Severa, 22 N.J. Super. 267, 91 A.2d 895 (1952). But see O'Connor v. Matzdorff,
76 Wash. 2d 589, 458 P.2d 154 (1969).
See, e.g., Hollier v. Broussard, 220 So. 2d 175 (La. App. 1969).
See Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948),
for an example of such a liberal standard.
8 If Washington does not require that the justice of the peace write an opinion
stating his reasons for the denial, review may be extremely difficult.88 76 Wash. 2d at 600-01, 458 P.2d at 160 (1969).
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of the benefits [intended for them] .... [If the judge is left with the
initial inquiry] either... the inquiries are superficial or... the court
is burdened with a duty stealing much time from true judicial work.87
Clearly, the opinion in O'Connor is susceptible to Maguire's analysis. But
why should any judge have to make an initial determination as to frivolity
or maliciousness of an indigent's suit? The courts "never bother with the
question at that stage if a litigant can pay the fees. These matters can
best be determined through discovery, motions for summary judgment,
and trial."
' 8
It is ironic that the solution offered to stop frivolous suits and assuage
the courts' fears of clogging will only tend to increase the problem. One
possible solution may be to determine the level of poverty at the outset
and then dismiss the claim later if it should prove frivolous,89 adding some
penalty to discourage similar occurrences. A second possibility is to re-
quire both reasonable proof of indigence and a minimal statement that
the party has a cause of action or a defense." The affidavit should contain
no more than a bare statement of an attorney or witness that he has re-
viewed the facts as presented by the petitioner and in his opinion they con-
stitute a proper claim or defense. 1 By following this procedure, the court
would be relieved of the burden of making an independent examination
of the facts before adjudication of the case. Likewise such a provision
should eliminate clogging of the courts, for the affiant or the claimant
would be sanctioned later if the claim proved frivolous.4"
THE NORTH CAROLINA STATUTORY SOLUTION
In North Carolina, as in many other states,48 waiver of costs in the
institution or defense44 of a suit and its appeal are governed by statute.
The applicable statutes are North Carolina General Statutes sections
87Maguire 389.88 Duniway 1286.
29Id.
'See, e.g., N.C. GmN. STAT. § 1-110 (1969).
'"Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331 (1948) (affidavit to
establish poverty).2 An attorney is unlikely to associate his name with a frivolous claim or defense.
Duniway 1285.
"
8 Twenty-nine states now have statutes governing in forma pauperis actions and
appeals. Brief for National Legal Aid and Defender Association as Amicus Curiae,
App. A, at la, Boddie v. Connecticut, 91 S. Ct. 780 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
NLADA Survey].
"' Fees and costs in North Carolina may be waived for a defendant only in a
suit "for land." See N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-112, -113 (1969).
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1-109(3) and 1-110 (governing bond at the institution of suit) ;45 sec-
tion 1-112 (waiver of bond for defendant in action "for land") ;46 section
1-228 (waiver of bond and transcript fees for appeal);47 section 6-24
(fees and costs waived at trial) ;48 section 109-29 (allowance of mortgage
instead of bond) ;49 and section 52A-11.1 (Uniform Reciprocal Enforce-
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-109(3) (1969) provides that should plaintiff not post
bond or "[f]ile with... [the clerk] a written authority from a judge or clerk of a
superior court, authorizing the plaintiff to sue as a pauper" then plaintiff's suit
shall be subject to dismissal.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-110 (1969) provides:
Any judge or clerk of the superior court may authorize a person to sue as a
pauper in their respective courts when he proves, by one or more witnesses,
that he has a good cause of action, and makes affidavit that he is unable to
comply with the preceding section [§ 1-109]. The court to which such sum-
mons is returnable may assign to the person suing as a pauper learned counsel,
who shall prosecute his action.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-112 (1969) provides:
The undertaking prescribed in the preceding section [§ 1-111] is not neces-
sary if an attorney practicing in the court where the action is pending certifies
to the court in writing that he has examined the case of the defendant and is
of the opinion that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover; and if the defendant
also filed an affidavit stating that he is unable to give and is not worth the
amount of the undertaking in any property whatsoever.
"7 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-288 (1969) provides:
When any party to a civil action tried... in the superior court at the time
of trial desires an appeal.., and is unable, by reason of his poverty, to make
the deposit or to give the security required by law for said appeal, it shall
be the duty of the judge or clerk of said superior court to make an order al-
lowing said party to appeal ... without giving security therefor. The party
desiring to appeal ... shall ... make affidavit that he is unable by reason of
his poverty to give the security required by law, and that he is advised by a
practicing attorney that there is error . . . in the decision of the superior
court .... The affidavit must be accompanied by a written statement from a
practicing attorney of said superior court that he has examined the affiant's
case, and is of opinion that the decision of the superior court... is contrary
to law. The request for appeal shall be passed upon and granted or denied
by the clerk .... The clerk of the superior court cannot demand his fees
for the transcript of the record for the appellate division of a party appealing
in forma pauperis, in case such appellant furnishes to the clerk two true and
correctly typewritten copies of such records on appeal. Nothing contained in
this section deprives the clerk of the superior court of his right to demand
his fees for his certificate and seal as now allowed by law in such cases.
Provided, that where the judge. . . or the clerk.., has made an order allow-
ing the appellant to appeal as a pauper and the appeal has been filed in the
appellate division, and an error or omission has been made in the affidavit
or certificate of counsel, and the error is called to the attention of the court
before the hearing of the argument of the case, the court shall permit an
amended affidavit or certificate to be filed correcting the error or omission.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-24 (1969) provides: "When any person sues as a pauper
no officer shall require of him any fee, and he shall recover no costs, except in
case of recovery by him."
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 109-29 (1966) provides:
It is lawful for any person desiring to commence any civil action or special
proceeding, or to defend the same.., to execute a mortgage on real estate of
1971]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ment of Support Act).5 Presumably the intent of the legislature was that
these statutes should form a comprehensive scheme giving the right of
judicial hearing to any man, be he rich or poor. Unfortunately the statutes
have not worked in such a manner. Their sometimes narrow and confus-
ing language often works to the detriment of the indigent, while the
judiciary has worsened the problem by allowing only the narrowest con-
struction possible and by requiring strict compliance with the statutes.
There have been, however, some North Carolina Supreme Court de-
cisions which abandon the line of narrow statutory interpretation and seek
to give positive aid to the indigent. A notable, but probably vitiated, one
is an 1813 decision, McClenahan v. Thomas,5 in which the court held that
the 1787 statute requiring security for "taking out a writ" and payment
of costs "in the event of failing in the suit" did not apply to indigents.52
The court based its decision on English statutory law 3 and concluded that
a law founded upon principles of such obvious justice ought to be
repealed by express words or necessary implication before the court
hastens [to conclude that a pauper has no relief]. For, indeed, the two
statutes are perfectly compatible, and being in pari nateria, should
both have operation, and may be construed together. On this ground
we think that persons may sue in this State in forna pauperis upon
satisfying the court that they have a reasonable ground of action, and
from their extreme poverty are unable to procure security. 4
Properly used, the decision in McClenahan could open the way for court-
made cure of a number of problems. It is entirely possible, however, that
the value of the bond or undertaking required to be given ... to the party to
whom the bond or undertaking would be required to be made ....
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52A-11.1 (1966) provides:
A court of this State acting as a responding state may in its discretion
direct that any part of all fees and costs incurred in this State, including
without limitation by enumeration, fees for filing, service of process, and
seizure of property, shall be paid by the county, but when an order of sup-
port is entered against a defendant, he shall be taxed with the costs. The
clerk of court, when this State is the initiating state, may upon a certification
by the county director of public welfare of the indigency of the plaintiff,
waive all fees and costs incurred in filing a petition hereunder.6 N.C. 247 (1813).2Id. at 248.
The court in McClenahan cites 23 Hen. VII, c. 15, as authority that paupers
were to be excluded from payment of costs. There is no such statute, but the court
probably was referring to 23 Hen. VIII, c. 15, § 2 (1531), which excludes pauper
plaintiffs from payments of costs after suffering a nonsuit, but directs that they
shall be punished in a reasonable manner.
" 6 N.C. at 248.
[Vol. 49
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a court would find that the decision has been undercut by the enactment
of more recent statutes. 5
The North Carolina statutes and cases hold other positive elements
for the indigent. The statutes do offer a chance to get into court, which is
more than some twenty odd other states allow.56 The court has held that
the statutory in formas pauperis privilege is available to nonresidents ;57
that the statutes apply to a court of a justice of the peace ;58 and that no
notice to a party plaintiff is necessary to defend without bond in a suit
"for land."59 Supreme Court Rule of Procedure 22 mitigates normal
costs of required briefs by allowing an indigent to file nine typewritten
copies of the record rather than submitting printed briefs.6" Finally,
North Carolina has adopted the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Sup-
port Act,6 ' which provides for payment of all fees by the county in the
discretion of the judge when this state is a "responding state."6 2 When
this state is the "initiating state," the clerk of court may waive the fees
upon certification of plaintiff's indigency from the director of public wel-
fare."3
Statutory Problems
Unfortunately, the credits of the North Carolina statutes diminish in
importance when compared with their corresponding debits. The statutes,
far from comprising a workable and comprehensive plan, show the effects
of piecemeal amendment over the years and of resultant conflicting lan-
guage and provisions. For instance, on the trial level as a plaintiff, the
indigent must show nonfrivolity by witnesses, 4 whereas on appeal65 and
" The case apparently has never been cited by the North Carolina Supreme
Court.
" See NLADA Survey.
"Porter v. Jones, 68 N.C. 320 (1873) (per curiam).
" Rowark v. Gaston, 67 N.C. 291 (1872) (per curiam). But see Comron v.
Standland, 103 N.C. 207, 9 S.E. 317 (1899).
" Deal v. Palmer, 68 N.C. 215 (1873).
"N.C. SuP. CT. R. 22, 4A N. C. GEn. STAT. (App. 1 1955).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52A-1 to -20 (1966).
" The responding state has control over the substance of the action. The initiat-
ing state has no jurisdiction to make any binding determination between the par-
ties. Note, however, that the defendant is taxed by the responding state with the
costs if he is found guilty of avoiding support, even though he was charged no fees
or costs at the outset. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52A-11.1 (1966).
"' Id. If this means that one has to be on welfare to be considered an indigent
when North Carolina is the initiating state, an excellent equal protection argument
is open to one whose income borders just above the welfare limit, yet who is
indigent in any meaningful sense.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-110 (1969).
"N.C. GFN. STAT. § 1-288 (1969).
19711
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at trial as a defendant,6 he must have an attorney certify that he has a
good defense, or that the record contains legal error, in addition to doing
so himself. At trial as a plaintiff, to show indigency he must allege that
he is "unable to comply" with the statute requiring prosecution bonds.0 7
Yet on appeal he must state that he is unable to "give the security re-
quired by law" ;68 and when defendant in a land action he must show that
he is "not worth the amount of the undertaking in any property whatso-
ever."'6 9 Clearly the differing requirements are confusing; yet should they
not be strictly complied with, the North Carolina Supreme Court has held
that the case or appeal will be dismissed.70
An even more confusing statutory provision than those noted above is
found in section 6-24.7' The statute was enacted in 1895, and has not been
construed or changed since the turn of the century. The grammatical con-
struction is loose enough so that it may be logically interpreted several
ways. The mandate of the section is that "no officer shall require of him
[the person suing as a pauper] any fee .... 1"7 Yet the succeeding two
phrases speak of costs, leaving the implication that costs may be taxed
against the unsuccessful plaintiff. It is equally arguable that since the
next two phrases-"and he shall recover no costs, except in case of re-
covery by him'"7 -- do not mention taxing, but only recovery of costs, the
legislature meant costs to be on equal footing with fees. Thus, a logical
way to read the section is to assume that fees and costs are coterminous.
That assumption would lead to this reading: the indigent, having paid no
costs or fees, shall recover none. Should the indigent win the action,
costs will be taxed against the defendant and used to reimburse the state.
Should the indigent lose the action, the state loses the amount of fees it
waived, and no costs may be taxed against the indigent. The supreme
court has seemingly agreed that should the plaintiff win, costs may be re-
covered from the defendant and must be paid to the court.74 The court
has not indicated what their holding would be on the converse-costs to
be taxed to plaintiff if he loses.
Even though confusing, there has been an attempt by the legislature
60 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-112 (1969).
67 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-110 (1969).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-288 (1969).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-112 (1969) (emphasis added).
See pp. 692-98 infra.
71 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-24 (1969). See note 48 supra.72 Id.7 Id.
7' Speller v. Speller, 119 N.C. 356, 357, 26 S.E. 160 (1896).
[Vol. 49
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to relieve the plight of the indigent plaintiff; the same cannot be said for
the indigent defendant. With the exception of a suit for land,75 there is no
statutory provision for a defense in forma pauperis. 78 Arguably the in-
digent defendant is more in need of statutory relief than the indigent
plaintiff. At least the plaintiff has a chance of getting an attorney on a
contingent basis who may pay his fees, or arrange for waiver. Unless the
defendant has some type of cross claim he must use his own funds to pay
costs, fees, and incidental expenses. It is a departure from reality to
imagine the indigent defendant capable of paying all these bills. Thus,
"[i] t may be that some defendants... simply default becaues they cannot
afford to litigate." There is no justification for the omission of a de-
fendant from the waiver statutes, given North Carolina's otherwise broad
attempt at statutory coverage.
Court-Created Problens
The North Carolina Supreme Court decisions construing the statutes
are generally narrow and strict, indicating disapproval of the statutory
remedy granted the indigent. It was pointed out previously that some of
the problems facing the courts in Washington were common ones; the
judicial hostility to the indigent noted in the first section is found also in
North Carolina. For example, in McIntire v. McIntire,78 the North
Carolina Supreme Court held:
Where a party to a civil action which has been tried in the Superior
Court, desires to appeal from a judgment rendered at such trial to this
Court, without giving security as required by C.S., 646, he must com-
ply strictly with the provisions of C.S., 649, which are mandatory.
Otherwise this Court is without jurisdiction of the appeal, and of its own
motion must dismiss the appeal? 9
Mclntire is illustrative' of the judicial attitude that the indigent faces.
While the attitude is probably not one of outright hostility, it is most
certainly not a favorable one. Whatever its label, the view is unfortunate.
Another of the court-created problems is the treatment of three parties
-the administrator, the attorney on contingent fee, and the assignee of a
5 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-111, -112 (1969).
" Silverstein, supra note 2, at 33-34.
Duniway 1285.203 N.C. 631, 166 S.E. 732 (1932) (per curiam).
Id. at 632, 166 S.E. at 733.80See also Martin v. Chasteen, 75 N.C. 96, 98-100 (1876).
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pauper's claim-who attempt to bring in forma pauperis proceedings on
behalf of or in the place of the pauper himself. With one exception, the
theme that runs through the cases is that the right of suit or appeal in
forma pauperis is a personal one, not assignable or transferable; where
other parties have an interest in the action they also will be required to
prove their poverty or be denied suit. The clearest example of this theme
occurs where a suit is filed by a pauper and is in progress and then the
claim is assigned to one not a pauper. Such occurred in Davis v. Higgins,s1
in which the assignee -was typified by the court as "a wealthy resident in
the city of New York.""2 The facts of the assignment were not brought
out at the trial, but upon their emergence at the appellate level, the court
held that the assignee did not acquire the right to sue as a pauper along
with the right to sue and that had the facts been brought to the attention
of the trial judge, the leave to sue in forma pauperis would have been
withdrawn."'
A situation similar to that of the assignee is that of the attorney who
takes an indigent's case on a contingent fee. In consideration for taking
plaintiff's claim, the attorney is "assigned" a percentage of any amount
recovered. The general rule is that an attorney on contingent fee is not a
party to suit to the extent that he has to prove his poverty as well as his
client's. s4 To date the North Carolina Supreme Court has not directly
considered the point, but in Allison v. Southern Railway 5 it stated that
[t]he plaintiff, in his affidavit, affirmed that he was unable to give a
prosecution bond in the sum of $200, or to make a deposit of like amount
for the same purpose; but it did not necessarily follow that he was un-
able -to compensate his counsel in some way other than by a division of
the amount of recovery, or that his counsel had not assumed the prose-
cution of the suit without compensation.8 6
The language leaves the impression that should the attorney be paid by
contingent fee, he must be presumed to be a party for proof-of-poverty pur-
81 91 N.C. 382 (1884).
821d. at 383.
"Id. at 388. See also Hamlin v. Neighbors, 75 N.C. 66 (1876) (per curiam),
in which plaintiff, suing in forma pauperis, died and his executor petitioned to be
allowed to take his place. The court held that the executor must file a petition
showing his poverty and reassert a good cause of action.8 See, e.g., Isrin v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. 2d 153, 403 P.2d 728, 45 Cal. Rptr.
320 (1965).129 N.C. 336, 40 S.E. 91 (1901), rev'd on other grounds, 190 U.S. 326 (1903).8 Id. at 337-38, 40 S.E. at 91-92.
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poses. The impression is buttressed by the indication in the concurring
opinion that the court should have held that even if the attorney were
paid on a contingent basis, he should not be considered a party.17
At an early date, in McKiel v. Cutler,s8 the court held that an admin-
istrator of an estate could not sue in forma pauperis. The holding was
based on the argument that while both the personal representative and the
estate might be insolvent, the creditors, legatees or next of kin normally
are not, and since the action-a suit for interest in property-was for their
benefit, they should bear the cost." Fifty years later in Christian v. Rail-
road Co.,"0 an action for wrongful death, the court was faced with facts
substantially similar to McKiel. The court distinguished the two, holding
that a wrongful death action did not actually accrue to the estate; that it
was a personal right of the administrator; and that should he be insolvent,
he could proceed in forma pauperis. The court refused to apply McKiel,
but also refused to overrule it. 2 Although Christian mitigates McKiel
somewhat, the more logical solution for the court to reach would be to
require that the estate alone be insolvent.
The third court-created problem is a procedural one-at what point
will an appellate court review a discretionary decision of a trial judge?
Of necessity many of the decisions made by the trier of facts will be dis-
cretionary ones. By leaving the trial judge with these decisions, a requisite
amount of flexibility is injected into the system. In order to maintain this
flexibility, the appellate court must be willing to find an abuse of discretion
in an appropriate situation. If not, the trial judge becomes paramount.
The North Carolina court has indicated three areas of decision that are
within the discretionary powers of the trial judge-frivolity, 3 level of
poverty, 4 and requirement of bond.95 The nature of the suit and whether
87 Id. at 343-44, 40 S.E. at 93-94. From a policy standpoint, the view in the con-
curring opinion is the better one. How is the indigent to obtain counsel if not on
a contingent fee basis?
8845 N.C. 139 (1853) (per curiam).
Id. at 140. Cf. Hamlin v. Neighbors, 75 N.C. 66 (1876) (per curiam).
00 136 N.C. 321, 48 S.E. 743 (1904).
°
1 Id. at 322-23, 40 S.E. 743-44.
Id. The concurring opinion quite rightly pointed out that the Code did not
cover this case. Since the Code only required the plaintiff to certify that he "is
unable to comply" with the bond requirement, why make a distinction? The logical
result is to overrule McKiel.
00 Brendle v. Heron, 68 N.C. 496 (1873) (per curiam).0 4Alston v. Holt, 172 N.C. 417, 90 S.E. 434 (1916) (by implication).
00 Modlin v. Atlantic Fire Ins. Co., 151 N.C. 35, 39, 65 S.E. 605, 607 (1909),
citing Christian v. Railroad Co., 136 N.C. 321, 48 S.E. 743 (1904).
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it is a good cause of action are controlled by sections 1-11016 and 1-288," 7
which require some averment by the petitioner that he believes or is ad-
vised that he has a good cause of action." Both also require a third party,
either a witness99 or an attorney,'00 to certify likewise. Apparently the
court has never considered whether it is an abuse for a trial judge to ac-
cept an affidavit or certification when the action is clearly frivolous. 101 In
fact, the court has apparently never found a per se abuse of discretion from
incorrect acceptance of any affidavit or certification. 10 2 Even though the
court has been unwilling to utter the magic word-abuse-the same effect
has been achieved where acceptance of an affidavit or certification has con-
flicted with the court's strong policy of strict construction of the acts. 0 3
In none of the cases does the court mention abuse of discretion; yet in
each it has been willing to reverse a trial judge on a discretionary decision.
The same phenomenon occurs when the trial judge considers the
poverty of the indigent. The court has held the determination of poverty
to be in the hands and discretion of the trial judge.104 Yet, even where
a trial judge found that the petitioner had more assets than alleged in his
affidavit but still allowed the in forma pauperis motion,10 5 the court did
not find abuse, but remanded to the trial judge to see if the affidavit "was
made in good faith."'0 6 Once again, however, where the finding of the
court below conflicts with the court's policy of strict construction, it will
reverse without hesitation. This has been done where the affidavit was
"See note 45 supra.
9 See note 47 supra.
"See notes 45 & 47 supra.
"See note 45 supra.
' See note 47 supra. Note that the trial judge determines the sufficiency of the
certificate and the affidavit for trial, and may do so for appeal. The clerk of su-
perior court may also judge the sufficiency of the certificate and affidavit.
"'A possible reason is the unwillingness of an attorney to sign his name to a
false certification.
... The court has held that refusal to grant leave to defend an action "for land"
when defendant has complied with the statute was incorrect. The holding was that
once the defendant has complied with the statute, an absolute right to sue in forma
pauperis vests in him, and "'it did not rest in the discretion of the court to refuse
to allow him to do so."' Wilson v. Fowler, 104 N.C. 471, 472, 10 S.E. 566 (1889),
citing Dempsey v. Rhodes, 93 N.C. 120, 125 (1885).
' E.g., Gilmore v. Imperial Life Ins. Co., 214 N.C. 674, 200 S.E. 407 (1939);
Lupton v. Hawkins, 210 N.C. 658, 188 S.E. 110 (1936); Noble v. Pritchett, 204
N.C. 804, 169 S.E. 618 (1933) (per curiam).
.'Alston v. Holt, 172 N.C. 417, 90 S.E. 434 (1916) (by implication).
... Perry v. Perry, 230 N.C. 515, 53 S.E.2d 457 (1949) (per curilam).
Id. The court merely asked the trial judge to review his allowance of the
appeal and made no attempt to examine the facts to determine whether an abuse of
discretion had occurred.
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not placed in the record1.. and where the affidavit contained some minor
deviation from the required formality. 08
In areas in which the court has no strong policy favoring strict con-
struction, the discretion of the trial judge is generally absolute. For ex-
ample, where petitioner had been allowed to sue in forma pauperis and the
trial judge subsequently denied a motion to require prosecution bond, the
court held that it was bound by the trial judge's decision, such being in
his discretion."0 9 Likewise, where a trial judge granted leave to sue in
forma pauperis and later required bond or dismissal, the court again held
that it could not participate in the decision since such decision was in the
absolute discretion of the trier of facts.:"
The fourth of the problems created by the North Carolina Supreme
Court is attitudinal-the court simply does not favor in forma pauperis
suits. Though this bias may be seen in the problems already discussed, it
is most obvious in three areas-fees, costs, and bonds. While fees, bonds
and costs are presumably governed by statute in North Carolina,"' the
court has taken every available opportunity to define and limit the
statutes where they are confusing or do not cover a particular item. The
general trend of the decisions is that while most costs are waived at trial,"2
and while bonds are waived at trial and on appeal, the costs and fees on
appeal for the most part are not. 3
Even at trial, where it would seem that all fees and costs would be
waived for the indigent, he is still responsible for witness fees." 4 Earlier
it was pointed out that in all actions except those for land, waiver of bond
at trial was not open to a defendant." 5 Clearly, therefore, fees and costs
..7 Noble v. Pritchett, 204 N.C. 804, 169 S.E. 618 (1933) (per curiam).
. See, e.g., Ogburn v. Sterchi Bros. Stores, 218 N.C. 507, 11 S.E.2d 460 (1940);
Waters v. Boyd, 179 N.C. 180, 102 S.E. 196 (1920). Hopefully this problem may
be partially cured by the 1937 amendment to N.C. GEL. STAT. § 1-288 (1969).
See note 47 supra.
10' Modlin v. Atlantic Fire Ins. Co., 151 N.C. 35, 65 S.E. 605 (1909) ; Christian
v. Railroad Co., 136 N.C. 321, 48 S.E. 743 (1904).
"° Alston v. Holt, 172 N.C. 417, 90 S.E. 434 (1916).
"
1 1 See statutes cited notes 45-47 supra.
"But see Whedbee v. Ruffin, 191 N.C. 257, 131 S.E. 653 (1926).
The theory is that the court below is presumed to be correct and "public of-
ficers are not called upon to render gratuitous services to impeach the result of a
trial already had." Bailey v. Brown, 105 N.C. 127, 129, 10 S.E. 1054 (1890).
It should also be noted that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-288 (1969), does provide for ap-
peal by a defendant by allowing "any party" to appeal. The court apparently has
never heard a case involving the right of a defendant to appeal in forma pauperis.
"Draper v. Buxton, 90 N.C. 182 (1884); Booshee v. Surles, 85 N.C. 90
(1881) ; Morris v. Rippy, 49 N.C. 533 (1857). Witness fees in North Carolina are
three dollars per day plus nine cents per mile. Expert witness fees are in the
discretion of the court. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-314 (1969).
.. See p. 689 supra.
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may not be waived for a defendant in a suit not involving land. Amazingly,
the court has also held that even in a suit for land the defendant is liable
for fees and costs.'"
The holdings of the court in regard to costs and fees on appeal closely
parallel those involving defendants in land suits." 7 Uniformly the court
has denied waiver of either to all indigents."' The court has recognized,
however, that costs on appeal are great and has made some effort to reduce
them.'"9 The legislature at times has had a similar attitude and by statute
in 1907120 overruled the court's requirement that payment be made for
transcripts on appeal.' 2 '
The single statutory provision that one would think inviolate is the
provision for waiver of bond at trial and on appeal. For the most part this
is a correct assumption. Where, however, a trial appellate judge later
finds that the indigent has property sufficient for bond, the judge will
immediately put the indigent to an election-either produce bond or the
action will be dismissed. 2 The situation is further complicated in a suit
for land because of the exacting poverty standard of the statute involved.123
In a set of facts where the indigent has nothing except land of small value,
the court has required that he mortgage it pursuant to section 109-29 or be
subject to dismissal."2 The court made this holding in spite of the per-
missive, rather than mandatory, provisions of section 109-29.12' In short
the court seemingly excluded the indigent from any other means of financ-
ing. Hopefully this is an improper interpretation. The court has also
held that an indigent may not give a mortgage in lieu of bond in a court
... Dempsey v. Rhodes, 93 N.C. 120 (1885).
""See, e.g., Speller v. Speller, 119 N.C. 356, 26 S.E. 160 (1896).
"'See, e.g., Martin v. Chasteen, 75 N.C. 96, 99 (1876).
"'N.C. Sup. CT. R. 22, 4A N.C. GENr. STAT. (App. I 1955).
12" Ch. 878, § 1, [1907] N.C. Sess. L. 1275. See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-288
(1969) (Editor' [sic] Note).
" Compare Bailey v. Brown, 105 N.C. 127, 129 (1890), and Andrews v. Whis-
nant, 83 N.C. 446, 448 (1880), with Skipper v. Kingsdale Lumber Co., 158 N.C.
322, 74 S.E. 342 (1912).
1.. Dale v. Presnell, 119 N.C. 489, 26 S.E. 27 (1896). In Dale, the court said
[t]his privilege.. . was only intended for the benefit of parties who could not
give the security. And when he becomes able to do so we see no reason why he
should not be put to his election to do so or to have his action dismissed.
Id. at 492, 26 S.E. at 28.
...N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-112 (1969), requires that defendant state "that he is
unable to give and is not worth the amount of the undertaking in any property
whatsoever."1
"Alston v. Holt, 172 N.C. 417, 90 S.E. 434 (1916).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 109-29 (1966), provides that "[ilt is lawful ... to execute
a mortgage on real estate [in lieu of a bond] . ... "
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of a justice of the peace if the indigent is found to have enough property
for bond. 26
Solutions
There are at least three alternatives within the present system that
could be used to produce a workable plan for granting effective access to
to the courts for the indigent. The most complete of the three possibilities
would be to revoke the present statutes and overrule the cases limiting the
remedies available to the indigent. As a substitute, the provisions of the
URESA could be adopted and made mandatory for all civil cases. The
tests for poverty and frivolity now in effect should be kept in substantially
the same form.127 It should be made a policy of the act that the determina-
tions of poverty and frivolity are in the discretion of the trial judge, subject
to review for abuse of discretion by the appellate court. It should finally
be indicated that the intent of the legislature is to give the indigent an ab-
solute right to entrance to the courts and that he is to be treated in the
same manner as any other plaintiff or defendant.
A second and somewhat less radical possibility would be to amend the
welfare laws to provide for complete subsidization of the welfare recipient
in court, subject to repayment if he is successful. A similar approach was
authorized by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Munkelwitz v. Hennepin
County Welfare Department,12 in which the court held that the au-
thorization by the legislature to the welfare department of " 'such support
or relief as the case may require' 129 was broad enough to cover legal ex-
penses. This approach has the disadvantage of excluding those not on wel-
fare, and is therefore subject to serious equal protection questions.
The third path for change is to leave the present statutory system as
is, and press for a judicial decision that the courts inherently have the
power to waive all fees, costs and bonds. The holding could be based par-
tially on McClenahan v. Thomas,30 though not entirely, since that case
was dependent on English statutory law. This is the least satisfactory of
120 Comron v. Standland, 103 N.C. 207, 9 S.E. 317 (1889).
The defect in these provisions is not their form or the fact that they are in
the discretion of the trial judge. The problem is that the trial judge has not par-
ticularly favored the indigent and has ruled against him in close cases, and the
decisions have generally not been reviewable because of the court's policy of re-
view of abuse of discretion. Given a liberal interpretation and a willingness to
declare abuse, the two procedures will work correctly.
1.8 280 Minn. 377, 159 N.W.2d 402 (1968).
112o Id. at 3,79, 159 N.W.2d at 403, citing MINN. STAT. § 261.03 (1967).
1206 N.C. 247 (1813).
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the three solutions because it depends on an extremely liberal interpreta-
tion of the powers of the court and of the common law.
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE INDIGENT
On March 2, 1971, the United States Supreme Court held, in Boddie
v. Connecticut,3' that "due process ... prohibit[s] the State from deny-
ing, solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals
who seek judicial dissolution of their marriages."' 13 2 Though the decision
is an important one, its primary use in this comment is to serve as a
measure of the constitutionality of the North Carolina statutes waiving
fees and costs for the indigent. However, the decision will be examined,
both to determine the method by which the Court reached its holding,
and also to spot any problems the holding may cause the indigent.
The Constitution as a Measure of an Indigent's Right to
Waiver of Fees and Costs
In Boddie plaintiffs filed a divorce action in a Connecticut superior
court, but tendered neither the filing fee required by statute,3 3 nor the
amount due the sheriff for service of process. 134 The Clerk of Superior
Court returned plaintiffs' papers, whereupon a class action was initiated
in federal district court to declare Connecticut's fee statute unconstitu-
tional as applied to plaintiffs and all persons similarly situated, and to
compel "the appropriate officials to permit them 'to proceed with their
divorce actions without payment of fees and costs.' ,,; A three-judge
panel held that Connecticut's failure to waive filing and service of process
fees for plaintiffs was not a violation of any constitutional right.13 0
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment requires a state to give an indigent plaintiff a hear-
ing in a divorce action without requiring plaintiff to pay fees.'3 7 The
Court first noted that the state has a monopoly over its court system.
Normally this monopoly is proper, even where it acts to exclude some
individuals from the courts, since there are usually other means of
settling disputes. 38 The Court noted that the only way to settle a mar-
S8191 S. Ct. 780 (1971).
182 Id. at 784.
"' CoNN. GEIN. STAT. REv. § 52-259 (Supp. 1970-71).
... CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv § 52-261 (Supp. 1970-71). The total amounted to
about sixty dollars. 91 S. Ct. at 783.
1sr 91 S. Ct. at 783-84.
. Boddie v. Connecticut, 286 F. Supp. 968 (D. Conn. 1968).
13791 S. Ct. at 784.
"13 Id. at 785.
[Vol. 49
INDIGENTS IN CIVIL COURT
riage dispute is through an agency of the state--the courts. Against this
background the Court stated the two principles decisive of the case-
that due process requires the state to give persons forced to settle their
claims in court an avenue to the court, 39 and that a statute may be
constitutional on its face and still be unconstitutional in its applica-
tion to specific persons. 4 ' The Court used four cases to buttress the first
contention: Windsor v. McVeigh,'41 Baldwin v. Hale,4 ' Hovey v. El-
liott,43 and Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.'4 4 The Court's
summation of the applicable holding in all four cases was
that due process requires, at a minimum, that absent a countervailing
state interest of overriding significance, persons forced to settle their
claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be given a
meaningful opportunity to be heard. 45
Such a statement of the four holdings is somewhat deceptive, in that all
four cases dealt with a defendant's right to be heard. The Court justified
extension of the defendant-oriented doctrine on the basis that in this case
the plaintiff had just as little choice as a defendant about going into court
since the state controls the institution of marriage and procedures for dis-
solution thereof.
To support the second principle, the Court cited Mullane and Covey v.
Town of Somers, 40 analogizing notice statutes to the present case. In both
Mullane and Covey valid notice statutes operated in an unconstitutional
manner to foreclose a defendant's right to be heard, just as in Boddie, a
valid fee statute operated to close a plaintiff from the only state agency in
which he could be heard.
As a final matter the Court disposed of Connecticut's contention that
substantial state interests, in the form of prevention of frivolous litigation
and allocation of scarce state resources, should justify the state in turning
away the indigent from the courtroom. With regard to frivolous litiga-
tion, the Court pointed out that the connection between a plaintiff's assets
and the quality of his litigation is tenuous at best, and in addition, that
there were other methods of discouraging frivolous litigation.147 In
"so Id.
1
,
0 Id. at 787.193 U.S. 274 (1876).
68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223 (1863).
1, 167 U.S. 409 (1897).
1" 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
14 91 S. Ct. at 785.
1,5 S51 U.S. 141 (1956).
14 91 S. Ct. at 788.
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dealing with Connecticut's quest for a self-financing judiciary, the Court
simply reaffirmed the rationale of Griffin v. Illinois48 that a state may not
impugn constitutional rights in order to fund its judicial agency.140
The major problem raised by the Court's resolution of Mrs. Boddie's
claim is that the decision is restricted to situations where the proceeding
is a divorce, and where "the bona fides of ... [the supplicants'] indigency
and desire for divorce are . . beyond dispute."'' 0 Thus, it would seem
that the indigent has a constitutional right to waiver of fees and costs only
where (1) the action pursued is a divorce, (2) there has been a deter-
mination that the plaintiff (or defendant) is an indigent, and that he
desires a divorce, and (3) the facts determined in (2), above, are "be-
yond dispute."
Though the first requirement limits the number of indigents who may
have waiver of fees and costs as a constitutional right, it is less troubling
than the second and third requirements. Possibly the Court could have
gone further and granted all indigents the right to waiver of costs and
fees.'- 1 The Court did not reach such result, however, and it is useless
to do other than live with what we have, and actively work for a more
inclusive decision in the future.
Requirements two and three could pose serious problems for the in-
digent. The Court gave the states no guidelines for making these de-
terminations, thus allowing each state to set its own standards. Thus, by
limiting its opinion, and by failing to set adequate guidelines, the Court
has forced the states to determine beyond dispute if the person in question
is truly indigent and truly desires a divorce.
What standards a state will use to determine whether an indigent de-
sires a divorce is an open question. A better question is why should the
indigent be forced to prove that he desires a divorce? In the normal case,
such desire is not an item of proof. If, during the process of the action, it
is found that the parties do not want a divorce, the action is dismissed and
costs are taxed to the plaintiff. Why not apply the same standard to the
18 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
1'9 91 S. Ct. at 788.
150 Id.1
"Id. at 791 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Id. at 788-89. As Jus-
tices Douglas and Brennan suggest in their concurring opinions, the case could
easily have been decided on the basis of the equal protection rationale found in
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), and its progeny. Mr. Justice Brennan
also argued that the Court's distinction between divorce and the normal civil case
was meaningless. ["I see no constitutional distinction between appellants' attempt
to enforce this state statutory right and an attempt to vindicate any other right
arising under federal or state law." 91 S. Ct. at 7911.
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indigent? The Court itself made an analogous point when speaking of a
state's use of fee statutes to discourage frivolous litigation." 2 It would
seem that the argument should be extended to cover this requirement.
The question of what the level of poverty should be in order to qualify
as an indigent has been explored to some extent previously. As already
noted, many states have established indigency standards, and there is wide
variance. 53 Variance of standards is not bad; however, some states have
standards set so low that it is almost impossible for anyone to be in-
digent.'54 This problem of restrictive standards is further complicated
by the Court's requirement that proof of indigency be "beyond dispute."
If "beyond dispute" is to be taken as requiring the highest level of proof,
this factor when combined with the Court's failure to prescribe reasonable
guidelines may allow a state to exclude many of the indigent from the
courtroom until the Court rules on what constitutes acceptable indigency
standards.
The Constitution As a Measure of the North Carolina
Indigency Statutes
Measured by Boddie the North Carolina statutes waiving fees and
costs for indigents seem to comply with constitutional standards. The
same statement may not hold true for the statutes as construed by the
North Carolina Supreme Court. For instance, in Whedbee v. Ruffine5
the court stated that "[t] he right to sue as a pauper is a favor granted by
the court and remains throughout the trial in the power and discretion of
the court."' 55 This dictum is in clear conflict with the United States Su-
preme Court holding in Boddie. In divorce cases at least, the indigent has
a right to fee waiver once he has complied with the Boddie requirements,
not merely a privilege. The answer to this argument is to admit that the
constitutional grant is one of right, but point out that the decisions as to
indigency and frivolity (desire for divorce) still lie in the discretion of
the trial judge. Thus North Carolina arguably may still retain its policies
regarding the ambit of the trial judge's discretion and review of that dis-
cretion.
A second instance in which the policies of the North Carolina Supreme
Court when coupled with the statutes may fail to meet constitutional stan-
r,2 91 S. Ct. at 788.
... See note 43 supra. See also notes 3 & 4 supra.
' See note 30 supra.
105 191 N.C. 257, 131 S.E. 653 (1926).
1 Id. at 259, 131 S.E. at 654.
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dards lies in the previously discussed area of strict compliance with tech-
nical rules.'57 The North Carolina Supreme Court's policy seems to be
that since what is granted is a favor, strict compliance with the statutes
is necessary to avoid a waiver. Since what is granted is no longer a favor,
but a matter of right, at least in some limited circumstances, strict com-
pliance should no longer be necessary. Yet it is clear that a constitutional
right may be knowingly waived. Examples that come to mind immediately
are waivers of Miranda rights 5" and fifth amendment rights.' In each
of these situations, however, the individual defendant must make the
waiver. In many of the North Carolina cases, the error involved is one
made by the attorney of the indigent.' 10 Although the attorney is his
client's agent, it is arguable whether he may waive a constitutional right
for his principal. In addition, the waiver required is a knowing one.
Again, it is at least arguable that an indigent will never know enough
about all the technicalities required by the cases and statutes to know-
ingly waive his constitutional right to courtroom entry in divorce cases.
Thus, it may well be that the requirement of strict technical compliance
with the statutes endorsed by the North Carolina Supreme Court is not a
constitutionally acceptable one.
CONCLUSION
It is axiomatic to say that the lower socio-economic groups in this
country have not shared access to the civil courtroom with those better
situated. Both the courts and the legislatures have recognized the in-
equality and both are to be congratulated for attempting to change it. Yet
much needs to be done.
The O'Connor decision holds promise, but has not been tested enough
at this writing to determine if it will offer access to the courts to a sig-
nificant number of the poor. Boddie is extremely narrow in coverage. In
addition, it contains ambiguities that will take many years of litigation to
clarify. The North Carolina fee and cost waiver statutes do not protect
the indigent from enough of the costs of litigation. In addition, the North
Carolina Supreme Court cases interpreting the statutes further restrict the
statutory ambit, and may possibly make them unconstitutional in their
operation.
Each of these attempts to give the indigent access to the civil court is
... See pp. 693-99 supra.
..
8 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
o Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949).
See, e.g., Queen v. Snowbird Valley R.R., 161 N.C. 217, 76 S.E. 682 (1912).
[Vol. 49
